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Abstract
Background: Prompted by the need to achieve progress in health outcomes, payment for performance (P4P) schemes
are becoming popular policy options in the health systems in many low income countries. This paper describes the
policy process behind the introduction of a payment for performance scheme in the health sector of
Tanzania illuminating in particular the interests of and roles played by the Government of Norway, the
Government of Tanzania and the other development partners.
Methods: The study employed a qualitative research design using in-depth interviews (IDIs), observations and
document reviews. Thirteen IDIs with key-informants representing the views of ten donor agencies and government
departments influential in the process of introducing the P4P scheme in Tanzania were conducted in Dar es Salaam,
Tanzania and Oslo, Norway. Data was collected on the main trends and thematic priorities in development aid policy,
countries and actors perceived to be proponents and opponents to the P4P scheme, and P4P agenda setting in
Tanzania.
Results: The initial introduction of P4P in the health sector of Tanzania was controversial. The actors involved including
the bilateral donors in the Health Basket Fund, the World Bank, the Tanzanian Government and high level politicians
outside the Health Basket Fund fought for their values and interests and formed alliances that shifted in the course of
the process. The process was characterized by high political pressure, conflicts, changing alliances, and, as it evolved,
consensus building.
Conclusion: The P4P policy process was highly political with external actors playing a significant role in influencing the
agenda in Tanzania, leaving less space for the Government of Tanzania to provide leadership in the process. Norway in
particular, took a leading role in setting the agenda. The process of introducing P4P became long and frustrating causing
mistrust among partners in the Health Basket Fund.
Keywords: Payment for performance (P4P), Results-based financing (RBF), Health systems, Low-income contexts,
Partnership, Maternal and child health, Health worker motivation, Tanzania
Background
In the last decade, expenditure on health has increased in
many low income countries, but this increase is not com-
monly matched by better service delivery [1]. User needs
and demands are far from met, and in many countries the
health system continues to be plagued by inefficiency due
to worker absenteeism and resource leakage, poor quality
of care and inequity in access to health services [2]. There
is a growing confidence in Payment for Performance (P4P)
as a tool to address these problems [2], both among donor-
and recipient countries. P4P is defined as payment issued
upon achievement of a predetermined performance target
[3]. While donor countries see the P4P mechanism as an
attempt to improve the efficiency of aid by emphasizing
measurable results, recipient countries see P4P schemes as
an opportunity to fulfil unmet health needs.
There are a number of arguments for and against the
use of provider P4P mechanism in the health sector of
low income countries and both these arguments are sup-
ported by empirical studies. On one hand, it is argued that
P4P represents a powerful motivational tool to improve
the way health facilities and individual health workers re-
spond to users. It is also argued that P4P can facilitate the
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pooling and integration of resources and thus improve ef-
ficiency and the potential spill-over effect into the whole
public sector in low income countries [2]. A study carried
out in Rwanda concluded that P4P can be an effective tool
to strengthen the quality and the use of maternal and
child health services [4]. On the other hand, there are
strong arguments against introducing P4P in the health
sector. Through the introduction of monetary incentives,
it is argued that P4P is ‘crowding out intrinsic motivation’ ,
undermines motivation among workers who are not part
of the P4P scheme and erodes social relations and team-
work through competition and envy [5, 6]. Studies in
Rwanda and Tanzania have found negative unintended ef-
fects of P4P schemes including gaming and the introduc-
tion of adverse sanctions [6–8]. The evidence available on
P4P schemes in health care is thus inconclusive and can-
not be documented across settings [9].
Despite lack of solid evidence on effectiveness, P4P is
gaining political support, and a number of countries in
sub-Saharan Africa, including Tanzania, are trying out P4P
to accelerate the progress towards Millennium Develop-
ment Goals (MDG) 4 and 5 to improve child and maternal
health. Like other low income countries, Tanzania is facing
huge challenges in providing good quality health care to its
population, and inadequate funds and lack of human and
material resources negatively affect the motivation and per-
formance of health workers [10–12]. Less than half of all
deliveries are attended by skilled personnel [13], and the
quality of birth care is generally poor [14]. Maternal mor-
tality in Tanzania in 2013 was at 390 maternal deaths per
100,000 live births [15] and neonatal mortality in 2013 was
at 21 neonatal deaths per 1000 live births [16].
To improve the quality and the utilization of maternal
health services a P4P pilot was introduced in Tanzania in
2011 [17]. The decision making process that led to the
introduction of P4P involved many bilateral and inter-
national partners with different agendas. It has been ob-
served that inadequate attention has been given to policy
development processes in the health sector of low income
countries [18]. Attention has been paid to the policy con-
tents, ignoring why and how the reforms are carried out
and the actors involved [19]. Our study aims to bridge this
gap by investigating the policy process behind the intro-
duction of P4P in maternal and child health in Tanzania
illuminating in particular the interests and the roles played
by the Norwegian Government, the Tanzanian Govern-
ment and the other development partners. To situate the
study we first present the historical ideological context of
governance and the more recent partnership model of
governance in Tanzania.
From self-reliance to good governance
The Arusha Declaration of 1967 was based on the political
philosophy of Julius Nyerere, the first President of the
United Republic of Tanzania, and emphasized central plan-
ning and equitable access to services including health care
[20–22]. Nyerere and his vision of a self-reliant post-
colonial country attracted a lot of attention and aid from
countries all around the world [23]. In the 1980s many low
income countries adopted structural adjustment pol-
icies (SAPs) promoted by the International Monitory
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank as a necessary condition
for borrowing money and securing economic growth
[22, 23]. SAPs involved the scaling down of the public sec-
tor and stimulated private sector growth. Nyerere resisted
the pressure from IMF and the World Bank to introduce
structural adjustment policies in Tanzania [21, 23, 24], but
in the wake of the oil crisis in 1973 and a costly military
intervention in Uganda to overthrow Idi Amin in 1978–79,
Tanzania was in an economic crisis and in need of more
aid [23, 25]. Nyerere left office in 1985, paving way for a
new administration [23, 24] led by president Ali Hassan
Mwinyi, who had no option but to agree to the demands
of IMF and the World Bank.
A World Bank report of 1989 [26] defined the devel-
opment challenges in Africa as a crisis of governments’
inability to manage national affairs, or of governance,
and argued for a new development paradigm based on
good governance [27]. Good governance is defined as a
governing system “epitomized by predictable, open and
enlightened policy making; a bureaucracy imbued with a
professional ethos; an executive arm of government ac-
countable for its actions; and a strong civil society par-
ticipating in public affairs; and all behaving under the
rule of law” [28]. Under the good governance paradigm,
the notion of partnership between development partners
is central. Tanzania opened up to this new paradigm.
Partnership in the health sector
The relationship between Tanzania and donor countries
has not always been smooth with regard to agenda setting
and ownership. In 1995, sour relations between the Gov-
ernment of Tanzania and donors led to the appointment
of an advisory group to assess how the development co-
operation between the Government of Tanzania and the
official donor organizations could be strengthened and im-
proved. The outcome was a report critical to both the
donor countries for not giving Tanzania space for owner-
ship and to the Government of Tanzania for not being pro-
active in providing leadership [29].
About the same time the Government of Tanzania had
secured its first World Bank credit in the health sector [29]
and in 1999, a sector plan of action was developed with the
aim of pooling funds in the health sector. The Health Bas-
ket Fund was established as a pooling mechanism aiming
to simplify administration and coordination and give more
control to Tanzania [30]. These reforms put Tanzania in
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the driving seat and worked to increase donor confidence
in the country [24].
The Health Basket Fund, as an instrument of Tanzanian
ownership of all activities in the health sector, was led by
the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare and ini-
tially involved six donors: Norwegian Agency for De-
velopment Cooperation (Norad), Swiss Development
Cooperation (SDC), Danish International Development
Agency (Danida), Department for International Develop-
ment (DFID), Irish Aid, and the World Bank. The
Netherlands, Canadian International Development Agency
(CIDA), the German Development Bank (KfW), UNFPA
and UNICEF joined later [30]. In our study, we are particu-
larly interested in founding members of the Health Basket
Fund, as they have insight into the full history of the Health
Basket Fund and extensive knowledge of the power dynam-
ics and agenda setting in the Health Basket Fund over time.
Conceptualizing partnerships
Partnerships are often described in binary terms as ei-
ther ‘instrumental’ or ‘genuine’, or as either ‘strong’ or
‘weak’ [31, 32]. While the rhetoric of partnership tends
to emphasise a strong version which involves reciprocity,
policy dialogue and meeting commitments, a weak ver-
sion implies that decision making processes constantly
come under the review of donors, undermining the aim of
country ownership [33]. Maxwell and Riddell contend that
a weak version of partnership is commonly preferred by
donors (24). For partnerships to work well, Crawford
propose a framework with four factors indicating a genu-
ine partnership: (1) mutual co-operation between multiple
constituencies, both internal and external actors, (2) re-
spect for sovereignty and the right of national actors to
determine their own policy options, (3) equitable and
meaningful relationship, and (4) time and commitment to
build and maintain a strong partnership [31].
Donor-government partnership in Tanzania has been
termed a ‘contested process’, one which obscure a more
‘covert and insidious’ expression of power by development
partners [33]. The introduction of P4P to improve mater-
nal and child health in Tanzania is a case in point and illus-
trates a power struggle between shifting alliances within
the Health Basket Fund and tensions between the interests
of donors and the interests of the country as an agent of
its own development.
Methods
Study context
The study was carried out in 2012 and 2013 in two loca-
tions: Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Oslo, Norway.
Data collection and analysis
A qualitative study design was adopted to explore narra-
tives and perceptions surrounding the introduction of P4P
in Tanzania. In-depth interviews were conducted, observa-
tional activities were carried out and reviews of policy
document and other relevant secondary data were con-
ducted. Data was collected by the first author in two
phases, October-November 2012 in Oslo and January-
June 2013 in Dar es Salaam. Below is an account of the
method we used for data collection and how these
methods are triangulated in the study.
Participation in the meetings on P4P
The first author participated in a number of meetings on
P4P in Dar es Salaam in the period of January 2013 to
June 2013 both as a participant and as an observer. Two
of the meetings were particularly important. The first
was a P4P stakeholders meeting, held in January 2013
which gave an overview of the status of P4P in health
care in Tanzania and provided an opportunity to identify
influential actors in the field. During this meeting initial
contacts with potential informants in Dar es Salaam
were made. The meeting also contributed to the identifi-
cation of potential sources of secondary data for the
study. The second meeting occurred when the first author
was requested by the P4P joint assessment committee,
which consisted of Norad, the World Bank and USAID, to
assist as a resource person on literature on P4P in Tanzania
and other contexts. This role was important for gain-
ing access to and building rapport with central infor-
mants in the study.
Overall, the participation in the P4P meetings were
important for gathering background information, for re-
fining the research questions, for the identification of
potential informants, for the development of the inter-
view questions [34], and for mapping of secondary data
sources.
Policy documents
Policy documents were of utmost importance to the
study, and were used mainly from a realist perspective
[34], that is, as a means to understanding the P4P policy
and design in the Tanzanian context. Hence, policy doc-
uments were essential in providing background informa-
tion to the study and in defining the questions and
trajectories that were pursued in the in-depth interviews.
Policy documents central to our study include: The Pwani
region P4P pilot: design document [17], Health sector star-
tegic plan III (July 2009-June 2015) Partnership for deliver-
ing the MDGs [35]. The national road map strategic plan
to accelerate reduction of maternal, newborn and child
deaths [36], Payment for performance strategy 2008–2015
[37], Implementation guidelines- payment for performance
[38]. These policy documents have been instrumental in
uncovering the political frames and in supplementing pri-
mary data collected from the representatives of the Minis-
try of Health and Social Welfare.
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In-depth interviews (IDIs)
Detailed information on a range of themes related to the
introduction of P4P in the health sector in Tanzania was
obtained through IDIs conducted with representatives of
organizations and agencies identified during participant
observation in the meetings and conferences. The ques-
tions that were asked in interviews were tailored to suit
the perceived roles played by different actors, and this
process was aided by the information obtained in policy
documents, and during observations. Three interview
guides were designed: one for Government officials in
Tanzania; one for Norwegian informants, and one for
other development partners and stakeholders. Although
these three interview guides had different specific (for
detailed interview questions refer to additional files 1, 2,
and 3), they were all guided by the following general
themes: trends and thematic priorities in development aid
policy, countries and actors perceived to be proponents of
the P4P scheme, and agenda setting in the Tanzanian
Health Basket Fund and the introduction of P4P.
The P4P agenda in Tanzania was first introduced into
the Health Basket Fund. In choosing the informants for
the study, we used purposive sampling following two cri-
teria. To achieve the objective of the study we were in-
terested in the views of members of the Health Basket
Fund who were influential during the P4P introduction
process by either supporting or questioning the P4P
agenda. Through this criterion, we were able to identify the
Ministry of Health and Social Welfare of Tanzania, the
World Bank, the Norwegian Agency for Development Co-
operation (Norad), the Danish International Development
Assistance (Danida), the Swiss Agency for Development
and Cooperation (SDC), German International Cooper-
ation (GiZ) and Irish Aid. All these members (with the ex-
ception of GiZ) were formative members of the Health
Basket Fund in 1999. They were selected based on the as-
sumption that they therefore possessed more knowledge
on the founding principles of the Health Basket Fund than
members that joined at a later stage. Secondly, we were in-
terested in organizations/agencies outside the Health Bas-
ket Fund that appeared to be important stakeholders in the
P4P agenda setting and the subsequent P4P pilot. Based on
this criterion we identified the Clinton Health Access Ini-
tiative (CHAI), an organization managing the P4P scheme
in Tanzania on behalf of the Ministry of Health and Social
Welfare. In addition, we included the Norwegian Embassy
in Dar es Salaam, and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, who played an important role in introducing and
funding the P4P programme in Tanzania. From these 10
organizations/agencies, a total number of 13 in-depth in-
terviews with key-informants were conducted, 11 of these
in Dar es Salaam and two in Oslo. Informant selection in
the organizations focused on individuals knowledgeable of
the P4P agenda setting and process in Tanzania, and the
majority of our informants were representatives of their or-
ganizations in the Health Basket Fund. An overview of the
interviews conducted is summarized in Table 1.
All interviews were conducted in English and based on
informed consent, and all except two were recorded.
The two interviews were not recorded due to the prefer-
ence of the informants. In addition to recording, rapid
note taking was used in all interviews. The recorded IDIs
were transcribed verbatim and error checked. The ana-
lysis of the material started with a review of transcripts
which were later imported to NVivo 10 for data manage-
ment purposes. Qualitative content analysis was under-
taken, looking for both manifest and latent content [39].
Coding units were identified and condensed [39]. Sub-
themes were developed from the codes and defined into
themes that we used in presenting our results.
Research ethics
Research clearance was granted in Norway through the
Norwegian Social Science Data Services and in Tanzania
through the Ifakara Institutional Review Board, and the
National Institute for Medical Research (NIMR/HQ/R.8a/
Vol.IX/1515). Individual consent was sought and obtained
free of coercion.
Results
The introduction of P4P in the health sector in Tanzania
was controversial. The actors involved, including the bilat-
eral donors in the Health Basket Fund, the World Bank,
the Government of Tanzania and high level politicians
outside the Health Basket Fund, fought for their values
and interests and formed alliances that shifted in the
course of the process. In the following we will describe the
process with emphasis on 1) the role of high political pres-
sure, 2) the conflicts and changing alliances in the Health
Basket Fund, and 3) consensus building.
Table 1 Overview of IDIs
Agency/Organization Interviews
Ministry of Health and Social Welfare- Tanzania 2
World Bank – Tanzania 1
Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Norway 1
The Royal Norwegian Embassy – Tanzania 1
Norad 1
Danida 1
Irish Aid 1
GiZ Tanzania 2
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation 1
Clinton Health Access Initiative (CHAI) 2
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High political pressure
The history of Norwegian development aid to Tanzania
goes back to the early years after independence, and
Norway remains among the most influential donor coun-
tries in Tanzania. The idea of P4P in Tanzania originated
from the Norwegian-Tanzanian health sector partnership
initiative (NTPI) which was signed in 2007 by the President
of Tanzania and the Norwegian Prime Minister. The aim
of the partnership was to enhance progress to reach MDGs
4 and 5 using P4P mechanism. As all informants pointed
out, this was a top-down process. The P4P agenda was de-
fined by high level politicians both from Tanzania and
Norway. The prominent role of high level politicians led to
a considerable amount of political pressure to introduce
P4P in Tanzania. As one informant in the Norwegian Em-
bassy noted:
[Former] Prime Minister Stoltenberg of Norway and
President Kikwete of Tanzania met in 2007, so as you
can see the engagement was at a very high level
regarding P4P. After this meeting we were requested to
support the health sector [through P4P] in Tanzania,
but prior to this, the embassy wasn’t really visible in
the health sector in Tanzania. (Staff, Royal Norwegian
Embassy, Dar es Salaam)
The strong engagement of high level political actors
in the P4P agenda kept the involvement of technical
actors in defining and shaping the agenda on a low
level. In Norway, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was
said to have bypassed the Norwegian Agency for De-
velopment Cooperation (Norad), which provides tech-
nical support to the Ministry. Norad was not consulted
about the P4P agenda and Norad staff expressed great
scepticism to its introduction in Tanzania. As one inform-
ant pointed out:
We were raising some questions around P4P since we
had a feeling that the treatment was prescribed before
the diagnosis, because they said let’s do P4P in
Tanzania. Really, without even looking at what are
the barriers to the quality of services, to the
delivery of services and so on and so forth, but the
recipe was already coming, and we quietly and
quickly realized that we cannot maneuver much
outside this P4P thinking. (Official, Norad)
In Tanzania, the consensus among some high level bu-
reaucrats and technical staff in the Ministry of Health and
Social Welfare was that the health system was not ready
for P4P, as it was perceived as a piecemeal reform. It was
pointed out that there was need for a reform that takes a
systems approach to the challenges in the health sector of
Tanzania, as highlighted by the following quote:
The primary problem that we are facing in Tanzania
is a health system that isn’t working well. If you think
of the six building blocks of a health system, all those,
including financing, infrastructure, health management
information systems, among others, P4P could have
worked well if all these blocks were functioning well, so
around P4P you need to get the system working well for
desired results. (Official - Ministry of Health and
Social Welfare, Tanzania)
Partners in the Health Basket Fund, among them
Danida, SDC and Irish Aid, were not happy about how the
P4P agenda was introduced. The partners felt that P4P was
being pushed from above without adequate evidence show-
ing that such mechanisms work in low income contexts.
Officials from these international development agencies
interact with officials from the Government of Tanzania
regularly; hence there was a common understanding that
the P4P agenda was driven by high level politicians. The
understanding was that technical staff in the Ministry of
Health and Social Welfare in Tanzania was not in a pos-
ition to oppose or refuse the P4P agenda. As one informant
put it:
The thing is that there is political drive and political
push to go for that [P4P] and this political push
comes from Norway and therefore the government [of
Tanzania] was not in a position to say no despite that
the basic foundations to support P4P, either at health
facilities or in the health system were not available.
(Official, Danida)
Our reviews of policy documents showed a marked
lack of progress in health outcomes relating to MDG 4
and 5 in Tanzania [35, 36] and there was great pressure
on the Government of Tanzania to find a way of improv-
ing these health outcomes and reach the international
targets in child and maternal health. The need to docu-
ment better health outcomes stimulated and justified a
search for new strategies. As one official expressed:
People were saying we are not achieving enough
and we were mainly concerned that we might not
reach targets for health related MDGs, especially
goals 4 and 5. Because of this we were thinking of a
way to accelerate progress towards these targets.
(Official - Ministry of Health and Social Welfare,
Tanzania)
When politicians in Tanzania were searching for ways
to make progress in MDG 4 and 5, politicians in Norway
were looking for partners willing to use P4P schemes in
maternal and child health. One informant recalls how
Tanzania was chosen as a potential P4P partner:
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The Norwegian government wanted to go into countries
that were really struggling with child mortality as well as
infant mortality, and so countries were picked according
to that. India was one, and then Pakistan was chosen,
and then there was a need for some countries in Africa.
Tanzania became the obvious choice, because it is a
relatively easy country to work in, in terms of stable
political conditions, and also quite strong leadership,
with a strong President. (Official, Norad)
Conflicts and changing alliances in the health basket fund
The Government of Norway pulled out of the Health
Basket Fund in 2002, but re-joined in 2007, presumably
for the purpose of financing the P4P scheme in the
health sector. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs engaged
Norad as the Norwegian partner in the Health Basket
Fund with the assignment of introducing the P4P agenda
to the Health Basket partners. The move was not posi-
tively received by the majority of actors in the Health
Basket Fund:
Norad was just rejoining the health basket at the time
when we introduced the P4P agenda. People did not
approve of that, especially coming with such an agenda
of P4P, some of the donors were totally against it, like
the Danes, they were appalled by it both politically and
otherwise. Even the World Bank and USAID could not
come openly to support us for fear of a backlash. The
Dutch were furious, saying we were not serious, calling
us names, and saying we were trying to hijack the
Health Basket Fund. (Official, Norad)
Other development partners perceived it as disrespect-
ful to introduce such a highly value-laden and politically
charged agenda without broad consultation. Pushing the
P4P agenda through the Health Basket Fund was inter-
preted as going against the values of the partnership, es-
pecially the earmarking of funds in the basket. The
introduction of the agenda was therefore met with resist-
ance in Health Basket Fund.
In addition to conflicting values, opponents of the P4P
agenda pointed to the need to evaluate the feasibility of
P4P in the health sector of Tanzania in particular and low
income contexts in general. In response, Norad commis-
sioned two evaluations in 2008, whose findings did not
support the introduction of P4P scheme in Tanzania. The
reports concluded that there was lack of evidence on the
effectiveness of P4P [40] and that the health system in
Tanzania was not ready for a full scale national P4P
scheme [41].
However, preparatory work for a full scale national P4P
scheme had already started after the signing of the NTPI.
In 2008, the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare
produced two policy documents: the Payment for
performance strategy 2008–2015 [37], Implementation
guidelines- payment for performance [38]. The Govern-
ment of Tanzania was ready to start the implementation of
a full scale national P4P scheme. The Health Basket Fund
partners, notably Danida, SDC, and Irish Aid which were
and still are among the leading contributors of funds the
Health Basket continued to resist the agenda. In addition,
the position of the Norwegian partner on the agenda was
changing mainly because the results from the evaluations
did not support a full scale national P4P scheme. Instead,
Norad proposed a P4P pilot in one region. This suggestion
was openly supported by some of the members in the
Health Basket Fund among them The World Bank and
USAID, but was rejected by the Government of Tanzania:
The government’s position back then was that there were
too many pilots in the country and if there was going to
be anything it has to go full-scale. A pilot would mean
that one district or region would benefit. Tanzania
has a strong feeling about equity issues, you know
from our history, and because of this the government was
determined to go ahead with a full-scale implementation.
(Official - Ministry of Health and Social Welfare,
Tanzania)
While acknowledging the lack of adequate conditions
to implement a full scale national P4P scheme, the Gov-
ernment of Tanzania was adamant that they do not need
perfect conditions to start the scheme, instead they pre-
ferred a “learning by doing-approach”. In 2009, the Gov-
ernment of Tanzania went ahead attempting the
implementing of a full scale national P4P scheme. The
Health Basket Fund partners were not happy about this
move, including Norad:
P4P came with pressure such that the government was
forced to go full scale with P4P. Yet the system was not
ready and it didn’t function and the basket partners said
we cannot do it. We pulled out and did not finance that.
This was a real blow because it created tensions between
basket partners and the government. I really feel sorry.
We lost valuable time, energy and confidence in this
process. (Official, Swiss Development Cooperation)
The attempted full scale national P4P scheme did not
receive funding from the Health Basket Fund, but a few
districts implemented the scheme from 2009 to 2011.
With no funding and without a proper Health Manage-
ment Information Systems in place, the full scale national
P4P scheme faced a number of challenges.
The common position against the Government of
Tanzania’s full scale national P4P scheme improved rela-
tions among donor partners in the Health Basket Fund.
Most notably was the open support of the World Bank to
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the proposal of Norad for a P4P pilot in one region. Being
the main funder of the Health Basket Fund, the support of
the World Bank was important in redirecting the P4P
agenda in Tanzania. The interest and active pursuit of the
P4P agenda by the World Bank was not well received by
all members in the Health Basket Fund as some were still
skeptical to the agenda.
The World Bank is now putting P4P as a condition for
funding the basket. P4P may not be bad as such, but
we would expect the Bank to come with a lot of
expertise and negotiate with all the partners to get
that [the agenda] through, but it was not exactly like
that. It was discussed with the partners but I am not
sure if there was broad consensus on this approach. It
was pushed on the Basket and now we have to make
the best of it. (Official, Swiss Development
Cooperation)
As the full scale national P4P scheme became increas-
ingly difficult, the Government of Tanzania softened its
stance on the scope of the P4P scheme. Together with
the World Bank, Norad and USAID plans for a P4P pilot
in the Pwani Region were started. In 2011, the Pwani Re-
gion pilot was introduced in Tanzania with the aim of
scaling up after evaluation. The pilot was a result of con-
stant changes in alliance among members in the Health
Basket Fund.
Building consensus
The potential of scaling-up the P4P pilot meant that a
common position regarding the agenda needed consensus
among members of the Health Basket Fund. This consen-
sus building process had begun during our data collection
period. The Government of Tanzania, the World Bank,
Norad, and USAID were leading this process, as the fol-
lowing statement illustrates:
Things were not very clear when P4P was introduced.
People needed more understanding of the design and
operations of the program, which was not readily
available. Many were skeptical of the design, so
Norway, which is one of the members in the Basket,
asked if we could look more into the concept and this
is how the pilot came about. Now as we do these
assessments, we see that more donors are coming in
and a taskforce for P4P has been formed by the
Ministry and we have partners like USAID, the World
Bank and Norway, the Germans. Also the chair of the
basketeers [Irish Aid at the time] is being co-opted.
(Official, World Bank Tanzania)
In one of the meetings of the Joint Assessment com-
mittee comprising USAID, the World Bank and Ministry
of Health and Social Welfare, the possibility of inviting
other development partners to take part in recently
established ‘National P4P Taskforce’ was discussed. Se-
nior level politicians in Tanzania who had strongly ar-
gued for a full scale national P4P scheme gradually
changed position and increasingly supported the views
of their technical staff as shown by the following extract:
There is an emerging consensus that P4P needs to be
viewed within the broader health systems reforms…
there is need to make sure facilities receive essential
medicines in time, are well equipped and meet
minimum staffing standards so that they can perform
and deliver quality services. [Former Minister of
Health and Social Welfare, Tanzania [42]]
Opponents of P4P in Tanzania were calling for a whole
systems approach in implementing the P4P scheme. The
argument was that P4P must not be seen as the panacea
to problems facing the health sector of Tanzania; as such
the scheme has to be integrated in the existing efforts.
With high level political officials in Tanzania calling for a
whole systems approach to P4P, the scheme seems to be
approaching a large degree of consensus.
Discussion
In this section we will discuss Norway’s interest in the
P4P agenda and partnership contestations, and the role
of the government of Tanzania in the P4P agenda setting
linking it to the question of ownership.
Norway’s interest in the P4P agenda and partnership
contestations
Our data demonstrates that Norway played an important
part in bringing the P4P agenda to Tanzania. Norway’s
interest in P4P schemes in the health sector can be traced
to Jens Stoltenberg, who was the Norwegian Prime Minis-
ter 2000–2001 and 2005–2013. Stoltenberg, an economist
by training, supported the idea that saving the lives of
children in developing countries is a moral and political im-
perative which carries economic benefits [43, 44]. In 2007,
Stoltenberg launched the Global Campaign for the Health
Millennium Development Goals, a campaign promoting dif-
ferent initiatives, including P4P schemes, to ensure ‘value
for money’ while reaching the most vulnerable groups [45].
In addition to substantial financial support to the UN, glo-
bal child and maternal health campaigns, and global health
initiatives such as GAVI and the Gates Foundation, Norway
was and still is engaged in bilateral partnerships with sev-
eral countries lagging behind in MDGs 4 and 5, including
India, Tanzania, Nigeria and Malawi [43, 46].
Through the Norwegian Government’s involvement in
health related MDGs, in particular goals 4 and 5, Norway
emerged as a prominent player promoting the introduction
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of innovative financing mechanisms in health and other
sectors globally [44, 47, 48]. One should note that there
was high interest in the Norwegian policy environment re-
lating to outcomes of MDGs 4 and 5. We will examine this
interest using the agenda-setting circumstances concept in
Grindle and Thomas’s framework on political economy of
reform. The framework is used in analyzing policy and
organizational reforms in developing countries and its key
elements are environmental context of reform, the agenda-
setting circumstances and the policy characteristics [18, 49].
We find the agenda-setting circumstances adaptable to the
global policy agenda setting. According to the framework,
the policy agenda-setting circumstances can be perceived
as either a crisis situation or not [49]. When an agenda-set-
ting circumstance is seen as a crisis situation, there is be
high political interest and the involvement of policy elites.
In such circumstances, there is a sense of urgency to ‘do
something’ as political and economic stakes are high for in-
action [49]. We argue that the possibility of failing to meet
the health related MDGs could be interpreted as a crisis
situation, especially by the actors that had been actively
supporting them. In the same regard, a perceived crisis
situation calls for innovative strategies [49], such as using
P4P in the health sector of low income countries to accel-
erate progress towards MDGs 4 and 5. To this end, the
concept of agenda-setting circumstances helps to explain
the high level political interest in P4P on the Norwegian as
well as the Tanzanian side.
The other development partners in Tanzania did not
share this strong political interest in P4P. Our data show
that these actors in the Health Basket Fund did not ap-
prove of the way P4P was introduced in the Health Basket
Fund. The introduction was perceived to have been largely
politically motivated and not following the principles im-
portant in a partnership. To further shed light on this, we
apply Crawford’s framework on genuine partnership.
Crawford [31] proposed four principles guiding genuine
partnerships. The first principle emphasizes mutual co-
operation between actors. Our data suggests that different
actors in the partnership had different interests. Alliances
were constantly shifting in the Health Basket Fund. It was
perceived that Norway ‘pushed’ the P4P agenda before
seeking broad consensus and co-operation from all part-
ners. In the eyes of other long-term and major financial
contributors in the Health Basket Fund, such as Danida,
SDC and Irish Aid, Norway did not respect mutual co-
operation, a principle considered to be fundamental for a
genuine partnership. This, in our view, contributed to the
derailing of the P4P agenda in Tanzania.
The second principle of partnership concerns the sover-
eignty and right of national actors to make their own pol-
icy choices. In the context of the P4P agenda in Tanzania,
none of the international donors in the Health Basket
Fund observed this important principle. On different
occasions the P4P agenda was driven by international ac-
tors in the Health Basket Fund and not by the government
of Tanzania. Norway and the World Bank took turns in
pushing the agenda while the other development partners
constantly opposed the P4P agenda, even at times when
the Government of Tanzania had resolved to implement
the P4P reform. It can be argued that this stance by inter-
national actors neutralized the Government of Tanzania’s
prerogative to determine its own policy options.
The third principle by Crawford on genuine partner-
ship emphasizes equality. Our data support an image of
the Health Basket Fund in Tanzania as a power arena
where partners fought to promote their own values and
ideologies [31]. This is illustrated in particular by the
moment when the World Bank officially showed interest
in the P4P agenda which immediately gained momen-
tum. We argue that by being the largest funder in the
Health Basket Fund, the World Bank had more bargain-
ing power and clout to impose its worldview. As the
process unfolds, we see international actors engaging in
power games in leading or resisting the P4P agenda leav-
ing Tanzania as a less equal partner.
The fourth and final principle on a genuine partnership
encourages investment of time and commitment in the
building of a strong partnership [31]. Norway did not ob-
serve this principle. As a former member that re-joined
the partnership, Norway was expected to build trust
through showing commitment to the basket fund partners
over time. When Norway rushed to introduce the P4P
agenda despite heavy resistance, Norway sought alliance
with the World Bank, a powerful actor in the Health Bas-
ket Fund. This alliance over time increased the pro P4P
pressure beyond what Norway’s status as single donor
country would allow. This was interpreted by other part-
ners as manipulation of a partnership platform supposed
to be based on consensus and mutual interest.
Partnership theory tends to see strong partnerships as
the ideal or ‘real’ partnerships, while in practice, according
to Maxwell and Riddle, donors tend to prefer weak part-
nerships as it makes it easier to dominate agenda setting
[32]. The approach by Norway when introducing P4P to
the Tanzanian health sector appears to be a text-book ex-
ample of this.
It is important to try to understand why the Govern-
ment of Tanzania was not in control of the P4P agenda,
despite a clear interest in it as expressed in the policy doc-
uments and by the engagement of high level political ac-
tors in the Tanzanian context in setting the P4P agenda.
The role of the Tanzanian Government in P4P agenda
setting
National governments have important roles to play as plan-
ners and executors of national welfare systems, and this re-
mains their role also when they engage in partnerships
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such as the one under scrutiny here. According to partner-
ship theory, the recipient government is supposed to play a
pivotal role in priority setting and consensus building
among the partners and in assuming ownership to the pro-
grams and strategies developed by the partnership [31, 50].
It is therefore important for a proper understanding of the
P4P agenda setting to analyze how Tanzania played out its
role in the process.
The data presentation above clearly reflects a significant
level of ambivalence and indecision on the part of the
Tanzanian government. Most informants identified the
P4P agenda as owned by the Norwegian government ra-
ther than the Tanzanian. Moreover, the attempts actually
made by the Tanzanian government to influence the
process, such as its initiative to launch a nationally owned
P4P scheme, and its later insistence that the program
should go to scale, were over-ruled by the other part-
ners in the Health Basket Fund. It is demonstrated that at
technical and bureaucratic level, the Government of
Tanzania would have preferred a systems approach to
health sector challenges and not a standalone P4P initia-
tive. This all suggests that the Tanzanian Government was
unable to play the leading role in the process that it was
supposed to according to partnership principles. This may
have several reasons.
In a recent study of eight African countries’ negoti-
ation capital in aid using the country’s economic, polit-
ical, ideological and institutional factors as parameters,
Tanzania ranked among the weakest states [51]. This
strongly suggests that even if it wanted to, the Govern-
ment of Tanzania’s ability to take a leading role in the
negotiations around the introduction of P4P, thereby
contributing to making the Health Basket Fund a strong
partnership was rather limited. However, and perhaps
paradoxically, this may not have been in their interest.
As discussed above, donor partners tend to prefer weak
partnerships to strong ones because they are more easily
managed. Donors, obviously, also control the funding of
the partnerships, and may withhold funding or pull out
if they find that the partnership moves in a direction
they do not approve of, as exemplified by the Tanzanian
P4P pilot that the Health Basket Fund refused to fund.
Hence, although the partnership model emphasizes the
importance of mutual respect, cooperation and sover-
eignty [31], recipient partners may in fact gain most in
terms of funding and goodwill if they give up leadership
of the process and ownership of the agenda and follow
the lead of the donor partners.
There are several examples in the literature of Tanzania
following similar strategies in similar contexts [25, 52]
which further suggests that this may in fact be the coun-
try’s most preferred and rational approach in development
partnerships. This could also illuminate why Tanzania is
sometimes referred to as an unofficial ‘darling of the donor
community’ [52]. Donor countries tend to find the Gov-
ernment of Tanzania receptive to their ideas and agendas,
and respond by maintaining a high level of aid to the
country.
Study limitations
The study lacked the contributions of some of the stake-
holders in the Donor Partners Group for Health, which
were mentioned in our informants’ narratives such as
USAID and the Netherlands, whose views would have
enriched our study. In addition, our data could have been
enriched if we had managed to include more actors from
the Government of Tanzania. However, concerted efforts
were made during the course of the fieldwork to get in
touch with these organizations with limited and varying
success.
Conclusion
The process of introducing the P4P scheme in Tanzania
was fraught with tension, contestations, and mistrust. The
donor - government partnership in Tanzania as expressed
in the case of the Health Basket Fund, was by and large
dominated by donor countries and agencies. This left less
space for Tanzania to be proactive as an agent of its own
development. The study also demonstrates that while high
political interest is important in stimulating reforms, this
does not always translate into quick policy decisions.
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